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Introduction
 Decision theory is the analysis of the behavior of an

individual facing nonstrategic uncertainty.
 Decision theory is used when an organization or an
individual faces a problem of decision making or
dissatisfied with the existing decisions or when alternative
selection is specified.
 Decision making is an integral part of management
planning, organizing, controlling processes. The decision
maker selects one strategy(course of action) over others
depending on some criteria like utility, sales, cost or rate
of return.
 Decision theory depends on probability theory and Theory
of Cognition which was developed by Blaise Pascal, Daniel
Bernoulli, and Thomas Bayes.

Introduction (Cont..)
 All decisions, whether they are personal, public, or

business-related, are based on the decision maker’s
beliefs and values. Beliefs, called subjective priors in
decision theory, which logically stand between choices
and payoffs.

 Beliefs are primitive data for the rational actor model.

So the rational actor model also described as the
Beliefs, Preferences and Constraints model, or the BPC
model. A rational actor is an individual with consistent
preferences.

Introduction (Cont..)
 Decision making is the process of making a final choice

among several alternative possibilities.

 Decision-making

is the process of identifying and
choosing
alternatives
based
on
the
values,
preferences and beliefs of the decision-maker.

 We make a lot of decisions in our day-to-day life which

also

includes

CHOICES

choosing

BELIEFS

a

product

PAYOFFS

online.

Rational Actor Model
Procedural Rationality
 A method of decision making based on having perfect
information with which all possible courses of action are
carefully evaluated.
Bounded Rationality
 Rationality is limited by the information individuals have
the cognitive limitations of their minds and the finite
amount of time they have to make a decision satisfying.
Perceptions of Gains and Losses
 People value gains and losses differently
 Risk averse vs risk acceptant
Rationality is context dependent

The meaning of Rational Action
 In recent years there has been a great development of interest in the

principles and the problems of rational decision‐making and rational action.
Economists, mathematicians,
statisticians,
logicians,
engineers,
and
philosophers have all addressed their efforts to various phases of the general
problem of rationality.

 All people try to actively maximize their advantage in any situation and

therefore consistently try to minimize their losses is called rational action.

Time Inconsistency
 Human behavior exhibit weakness of will, in the sense that if there is a

long time period between choosing and experiencing the costs and
benefits of the choice, individuals can choose wisely, but when costs or
benefits are immediate, people make poor choices, longrun payoffs
being sacrificed in favor of immediate payoffs.

 In this example, where the consistency conditions are violated. Let

x mean “$100 at some time t” and let y mean “$110 at time t + 7”
where time t is measured in days. So
x:t
$100
y:t+7
$110
so, when time t=0 , x ≻ y but

x : t + 365
$100
y : (t + 30) + 365
$110
here at time t=365,
y ≻x
 Thus the exclusion condition for ≻ is violated, and because the
completeness condition for ⪰ implies the exclusion condition for
≻ , the completeness condition must be violated as well.
 Time inconsistency disappears if we model the individuals as

choosing over a slightly more complicated choice space in which
the distance between the time of choice and the time of delivery
of the object chosen is explicitly included in the object of choice.

 Decision-making is regarded as the cognitive process

resulting in the selection of a belief or a course of action
among several alternative possibilities. Behavioral
decision theorists have argued that there are important
areas in which individuals appear to have inconsistent
preferences.

Approaches to Decision Making
 Psychological:

Examining individual decisions in the
context of a set of needs, preferences and values the
individual has or seeks.

 Normative: The analysis of individual decisions concerned

with the logic of decision-making, and the invariant
choice it leads to.

 Cognitive: The decision-making process regarded as a

continuous process integrated in the interaction with the
environment.

Decision Field theory
 Decision field theory is a dynamic-cognitive approach to

human decision making.

 It describes how a person's preferences evolve across

time until a decision is reached rather than assuming a
fixed state of preference. It uses the sequential sampling
process to make decisions, consistent with the other
areas of cognition.

 It is used to predict how humans make decisions under

uncertainty, how decisions change under time pressure,
and how choice context changes preferences.

Sequential Sampling
 Decisions in the brain are based on the dynamic

accumulation of noisy activation for each action, and the
action whose activation first exceeds the threshold is
chosen.

3 Levels of Theories by Marr
 Marr in 1983 proposed 3 levels of theories about

cognitive systems.

 Highest level-theories aim to understand the abstract

goals, a system is trying to achieve.

 Intermediate level-theories are designed to explain the

dynamic processes used to achieve the top level goals.

 Lowest Level: Explains about context and effects
 Similarity effect
 Attraction effect
 Compromise effect

Example of Decision Field theory

Similarity Effect
 This refers to the effect, on choice probabilities, produced by

adding a competitive option D to an earlier choice set containing
only A and C, where option D is very similar to option C.
 Pr[ A | {A,C,D} ] > Pr[ C | {A,C,D} ]

 Adding a new option D to this choice set, mainly takes away

probability from the nearby option C, and leaves the probability of
choosing option A unaffected.

Compromise Effect
 This refers to the effect, on choice probabilities, of adding

an intermediate option B to an earlier choice set
containing only two extreme options A and C, where the
compromise B is midway between the two extremes.

 Adding the compromise option B to a set containing A

and C enhances the probability of the compromise
option.

 Pr[ B | {A,B,C} ] >Pr[A|{A,B,C}] = Pr[ C | {A,B,C}]

Attraction Effect
 This refers to the effect, on choice probabilities, of adding

a decoy option F to an earlier choice set containing only
options A and C, where the decoy F is similar to, but also
dominated by, option C.

 Adding the decoy option F to this choice set enhances

the probability of the nearby dominant option C

 Pr[C|{A,C,F}] > Pr[C|{A, C}]

Predictions for the three effects

Loss Aversion
 Loss aversion refers to people's tendency to prefer

avoiding losses to acquiring equivalent gains

 Decision Field Theory provides an explanation for loss

aversion through the lateral inhibition mechanism.

Options Examining Loss Aversion

Predictions for Loss aversion effect

Predictions from DFT

 The DFT demonstrates an ability to account for a wide

range of findings from behavioral decision making for
which the purely algebraic and deterministic models
often used in economics and psychology cannot account.
 The decision processes of sensory-motor decisions are

beginning to be fairly well understood both at the
behavioral and neural levels.

Time Inconsistency
 Assumed that

individuals know their preferences, so
adding information concerning the current state of the
individual to the choice space eliminates preference
inconsistency. When we are hungry, scared, sleepy our
preference ordering adjusts accordingly.
 We should have a utility function that does not depend
on our current wealth, the current time, or our current
strategic circumstances is also not plausible.
 Traditional decision theory ignores the individual’s
current state, but behavioral decision theory has
brought to our attention.

 Behavioral decision theory show that humans violate

the principle of expected utility in systematic ways. This
does not imply that humans violate preference
consistency over the appropriate choice space but
rather that they have incorrect beliefs.
 To understand this, with the exception of hyperbolic
discounting when time is involved, there are no
reported failures of the expected utility theorem in
nonhumans.
 The difference between humans and other animals is
that the latter are tested in real life, but humans are
tested using imperfect analytical models of real-life
lotteries.

 Evolutionary game theory is based on the observation that

individuals are more likely to adopt behaviors that appear
to be successful for others.
 The existence of an integrated decision-making apparatus in
the human brain itself is predicted by evolutionary theory.
The fitness of an organism depends on how effectively it
make choices in an uncertain and varying environment.

 Effective choice must be a function of the organism’s state

of knowledge, which consists of the information supplied
by the sensory inputs that monitor the organism’s internal
states and its external environment.
 Brains therefore are ineluctably structured to make
consistent choices in the face of the various constellations
of sensory inputs their bearers commonly experience

•

In the set of behavioral properties, consistency is the
most prominent, so we can model agents as maximizers
of preferences.

A binary relation ʘA on a set A is a subset of A x A.
• [pronounced as Labial]
• We usually write the proposition (x, y) ∈ ʘA as x ʘA y.
•

• For instance, the arithmetical operator “less than” (<) is a

binary relation, where (x, y) ∈ < is normally written x < y.
A preference ordering ⪰A on A is a binary relation with
the following three properties, which must hold for all x,
y, z ∈ A and any set B:

Preference Ordering

Complete

Transitive

IIA

1. Complete: x ⪰

A

y or y ⪰

A

x;

 The first condition is completeness, which implies that any member of

A is weakly preferred to itself (for any x in A, x ⪰ x). In general, we
say a binary relation ʘ is reflexive.
Thus, completeness implies reflexivity. We refer to ⪰ as “weak
preference” in contrast with “strong preference” ≻ .
We define x ≻ y to mean “it is false that y ⪰ x.” We say x and y are
equivalent if x ⪰ y and y ⪰ x, and we write x ≈ y.
We may use elementary logic to prove that if ⪰ satisfies the
completeness condition, then ≻ satisfies the exclusion condition: if x
≻ y, then it is false that y ≻ x.

2. Transitive: x ⪰

A

y and y ⪰

A

z imply x ⪰

A

z;

 The second condition is transitivity, which says that x ⪰ y and y ⪰

z imply x ⪰ z. It may show that x ≻ y and y ⪰ z imply x ≻ z, and x
⪰ y and y ≻ z imply x ≻ z. Similarly, by using elementary logic we
can prove that if ⪰ satisfies the completeness condition, then ≈ is
transitive.

3. Independent of irrelevant alternatives: For x, y ∈ B, x ⪰
only if x ⪰ A y.

B

y if and

 The third condition, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)

means that the relative attractiveness of two choices does not depend
upon the other choices available to the individual.
 Suppose an individual generally prefers meat to fish when eating out,
but if the restaurant serves lobster, the individual believes the
restaurant serves superior fish, and hence prefers fish to meat, even
though he never chooses lobster; thus, IIA fails.
 When IIA fails, it can be restored by suitably refining the choice set.
For instance, we can specify two qualities of fish instead of one, in the
preceding example.
 If the desirability of an outcome x depends on the set A from which it
is chosen, we can form a new choice space Ω* , elements of which are
ordered pairs (A, x), where x ∈ A ⊆ Ω, and restrict choice sets in Ω*
to be subsets of Ω* all of whose first elements are equal. In this new
choice space, IIA is trivially satisfied.

 Rational actor described as the quality of people IN-GENERAL to aim









at maximizing their utility (profiting from action) as opposed to acting
against their self-interest.
Many economists believe that individuals do not always make rational
utility-maximizing decisions. For example, the field of behavioral
economics is based on the idea that individuals often make irrational
decisions and explores why they do so.
Suppose a man with $100 is considering how much to consume
himself and how much to give to charity. Suppose he faces a tax or
subsidy such that for each $1 he contributes to charity, he is obliged
to pay p dollars.
Thus, p > 1 represents a tax, while 0 < p < 1 represents a subsidy. We
can then treat p as the price of a unit contribution to charity and
model the individual as maximizing his utility for personal
consumption x and contributions to charity y, say u(x, y) subject to the
budget constraint x + py =100. Clearly, it is perfectly rational for him
to choose y>0.
Decision theory does not presuppose that the choices people make
are welfare-improving, In fact, people are often slaves to such passions
as smoking cigarettes, eating junk food, etc. These behaviors in no way

 However, organisms do not directly maximize fitness. For instance,

humans voluntarily limit family size. We can expect preferences to
satisfy the completeness condition because an organism must be
able to make a consistent choice in any situation it habitually faces.

 Suppose the organism has three decision centers in its brain, and

for any pair of choices, majority rule determines which the organism
prefers. Suppose the available choices are A, B, and C and the three
decision centers have preferences A ≻ B ≻ C, B ≻ C ≻ A, and C ≻ A
≻ B, respectively.

 Then when offered A or B, the individual chooses A, when offered B

or C, the individual chooses B, and when offered A and C, the
individual chooses C. Thus A ≻ B ≻ C ≻ A, and we have
intransitivity.

 For instance, smokers may know that their

habit will harm them in the long run, but
cannot sacrifice the present urge to indulge
in favor of the far-off reward of a healthy
future, We call this behavior timeinconsistent.

 Experiments proved that people exhibit a systematic tendency to

discount the near future at a higher rate than the distant future.

 Consider the following experiment where Subjects were offered a

choice between $100 on the day of the experiment or $110 a week
later. Many chose to take the $100 without delay. However, when the
same subjects were offered $100 to be delivered a year from the day
of the experiment or $110 to be delivered a year and a week from
the day of the experiment, many of those who could not wait a week
right now for an extra 10%, preferred to wait a week for an extra
10%, provided the agreed-upon wait was one year in the future.

 In this example, where the consistency conditions are violated. Let

x mean “$10 at some time t” and let y mean “$11 at time t + 7,”
where time t is measured in days. So
x:t
$10
y:t+7
$11
so, when time t=0 , x ≻ y but

x : t + 365
$10
y : (t + 7) + 365
$11
here at time t=365,
y ≻x
 Thus the exclusion condition for ≻ is violated, and because the
completeness condition for ⪰ implies the exclusion condition for
≻ , the completeness condition must be violated as well.
 Time inconsistency disappears if we model the individuals as

choosing over a slightly more complicated choice space in which
the distance between the time of choice and the time of delivery
of the object chosen is explicitly included in the object of choice.

 For example, we may write x0 to mean “$10 delivered immediately”

and x365 to mean “$10 delivered a year from today,” and similarly for
y7 and y372. Then the observation that x0 ≻ y7 and y372 ≻ x365 is no
contradiction.

 Time consistency results from assuming that utility is

additive
across time periods and that the instantaneous utility function is the
same in all time periods, with future utilities discounted to the
present at a fixed rate. This is called exponential discounting and is
widely assumed in economic models.
 Suppose an individual can choose between two consumption
streams x = x0 , x1 , …..or y = y0 , y1 , ……According to exponential
discounting, he has a utility function u(x) and a constant δ ∈ (0, 1)
such that the total utility of stream x is given by
(1.1)

 We call δ the individual’s discount factor. Often we write δ =

where we interpret r > 0 as the individual’s one-period continuouslycompounded interest rate, in which case (1.1) becomes
(1.2)

 This form clarifies why we call this “exponential” discounting. The

individual strictly prefers consumption stream x over stream y if and
only if U(x) > U(y). In the simple compounding case, where the interest
accrues at the end of the period, we write δ=1/(1+r), and (1.2) become
(1.3)

 Despite

the elegance of exponential discounting, observed
intertemporal choice for humans appears to fit more closely the model
of hyperbolic discounting.

 For instance, continuing the previous example,
 Let zt

amount of money delivered t days from today
 Then the utility of zt will be
u(zt ) = z / (t+1)
.

 The value of x0 (for today, t = 0) is thus

u(x0) = u(100) = 10/(0+1) = 10, and
the value of y7 is
u(y7) = u(117) = 11/(7+1) = 11/8 = 1.375,
so x0 ≻ y7
But the value of x365 is
u(x365) = 10/(365+1) = 10/366 = 0.027
while the value of y372 is
u(y372) = 11/(365+7+1) = 11/373 = 0.029,
so y372 ≻ x365.
 There is also evidence that people have different rates of discount

for different types of outcomes.

 Neurological research suggests that balancing current and

future payoffs involves adjudication among structurally distinct
and spatially separated modules that arose in different stages
in the evolution of H. sapiens
 Time inconsistency doubtless exists and is important in
modeling human behavior, but this does not imply that
people are irrational in the weak sense of preference
consistency.
 We can model the behavior of time-inconsistent rational
individuals by assuming they maximize their time-dependent
preference functions.
 With respect to the better understanding of neuro-cognitive
processing involved in intertemporal choice, it may be
important to examine the relationship between intertemporal
choice and decision under risk. Several studies have proposed
that a framework for intertemporal choice can also be utilized
for decision under uncertainty.

Conclusion
 In fact, humans are much closer to time consistency and

have much longer time horizons than any other species,
probably by several orders of magnitude.
 Experimental evidence on choice under uncertainty is still
of great importance because in the modern world we are
increasingly called upon to make such “unnatural” choices
based on scientific evidence concerning payoffs and their
probabilities.
 Time preference is one of the fundamental factors in

decision making process. Understanding the nature of this
time preference provides us with deep insight into human
behaviors and economic decisions.

